Contain and Constrain Russia - Towards a Western holistic and effects-based containment strategy

Food-for-Thought

Dear Reader,

Our world has entered a complex, dangerous and unpredictable new chapter that poses nothing less than a fundamental threat to our global rules-based order. Navigating this turmoiled period and responding to the multiple challenges posed to the European and transatlantic community require an unillusioned evaluation of the wider strategic landscape and, more importantly, the skilful and courageous statecraft that once led the West to win the Cold War. Here’s some food-for-thought on what I have been advocating since Russia launched its full-scale assault on Ukraine: a robust and holistic containment strategy.

Scene-setting

1. 31 months into Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine there are no indications that the Kremlin is prepared to alter its strategic objectives. Still, Russia seeks to destroy Ukraine to the extent possible, deplete its important industrial basis in the east, limit its access to the Black Sea to a minimum and maintain permanent control over the five illegally annexed Ukrainian regions. By subjugating Europe’s second largest country and denying the Ukrainian people the right to make free and independent choices about their future statehood, Russian President Putin intends to impose a ‘Yalta-type’ political order on Europe with brute force. Destabilizing European democracies and weaking the transatlantic security link has been part of the Kremlin’s playbook for a long time; now, in Putin’s mind, is the right time to expand and cement Russia’s zone of influence in Europe and establish new power rules.

2. Despite economic setbacks and significant losses on the battlefield, Moscow continues to prepare for a long war, calculating that, over time, Ukrainians will become exhausted and Western and international support for them will wither. At home, there is no organised democratic opposition in sight that could seriously challenge the regime in the foreseeable future. Putin still controls all important levers of power; and large parts of the Russian society either support the Kremlin’s war policy or remain agnostic. Abroad, Russia is far from being internationally isolated. In the past two and more years Moscow was able to foster relations with the enlarged group of BRICS-members as well as to long-standing allies and associates in Africa and the Middle East. Close political, economic, and military-technical cooperation with China, Iran and North Korea are an integral part of Russia’s surge against Ukraine and its Western backers. And despite harsh Western criticism and sanctions, Russia has neither lost its seat in the UN Security Council nor has failed to circumvent Western sanctions.

3. With the third war winter approaching, the Moscow regime must be expected to fortify and expand Russian defence lines in the occupied territories, destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and terrorize the Ukrainian population with missiles, drones and artillery shells. There should be little doubt that Moscow will also upgrade its disinformation campaign and aggressive hybrid activities specifically in those NATO and EU member countries where governments are hesitant to embark on a robust confrontational course with Moscow, and where ‘Ukraine fatigue’ is on the rise. Wherever feasible, the Kremlin will continue to test the West’s resolve and exploit any weakness it can turn to its advantage.

The forthcoming U.S. presidential elections, along with prospects of a Putin-friendly Donald Trump moving back into the White House, as well as the palpable reluctance of the German government are two critical elements of which the Kremlin will seek to take advantage. For obvious reasons, Turkey, Hungary and Slovakia are additional weak links in the Western camp. Wherever feasible, Russia will also look for (or actively create) opportunities to solidify its influence in Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans region; and it will seek to tighten its grip on the government in Minsk.

4. All this implies that Russia will continue to pose a deadly threat to Ukraine and a fundamental strategic and military challenge to European security. A protracted or frozen conflict will only benefit Russia and weaken Ukraine politically, economically, and militarily, as does a negotiated settlement on Moscow’s terms. If the West is to avoid these outcomes and support Ukraine turning its defence and incremental battlefield gains into outright victory, it needs far more ambitious and faster international military and financial assistance than it has received to date.

5. Repeated political statements from governments across the West of ‘’Standing with Ukraine as long as it takes” cannot conceal the frustrating reality that the West’s reaction to Russia’s illegal and brutal war against Ukraine has been weak in every aspect:

Neither the European Union (EU) nor NATO have been able to muster the political will to craft a forward-leaning and clear strategy towards Russia and agree on a common vision for the end game for Ukraine. Instead, EU and NATO members, with national variations, continue to pursue a policy of escalation avoidance towards Moscow and provide military aid to Ukraine ‘too little, too late’, and restricted by national caveats. To make things even worse, Western governments broadcast their own ‘red lines’, national defence shortcomings and nuclear doomsday scenarios on the global information market. Not in all but many of the 32 allied countries, the policy makers’ doubt in a Ukrainian victory has been plain since the early days of the war.

The reason for the West’s weak reaction is not only linked to Russia’s perceived military strength and fears of nuclear escalation. More than anything, many Western leaders believe it would be politically suicidal to admit that Russia has started to wage hybrid war on their countries, too. In public, they do their utmost to deny this bitter reality, stressing in infinite loops their efforts to keep Russia’s war at bay. To be fair, not all of the 32 NATO allies pursue this approach: the so-called front states Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Sweden, Finland as well as the United Kingdom and Denmark do not hesitate to articulate a crystal-clear view of the Russian threat, whereas other NATO members, noticeably the U.S., Germany, Canada and several southern allies, do not regard Moscow’s assault on Ukraine as a direct threat to their national security.

6. Unsurprisingly, therefore, some of Ukraine’s Western backers have started a public debate about ending the war as soon as possible and re-establishing ‘peace`. Many of these ‘proposals’ include notions which would effectively appease Russia, betray Ukraine, and further endanger European security. The combination of gloomy assessments of Ukraine’s military capacities, fears of nuclear escalation and a growing reluctance to take difficult decisions about financial priorities at home has brought the Western camp’s support for Ukraine to a dangerous tipping point. The current situation is exacerbated by the many uncertainties about the ramifications for European security should Donald Trump win the November elections.

Alas, calls on Ukraine to ‘accept reality’ and ‘trade land for peace’ ignore the fact that Moscow remains absolutely unwilling to renounce its ambition to eliminate Ukraine as a sovereign country, fortify Russia’s zone of influence and destabilize Europe at large. Moreover, the so-called ‘peace’ proposals send a fatal strategic message to other authoritarian regimes. Leaders in China, Iran, North Korea, India and many regional powers interpret Western policy discussions about Ukraine as a demonstration of the West’s reluctance and unwillingness to defend its security interests and values in front of its own doorsteps. Rightly or wrongly, Europeans are increasingly viewed as risk- avert and complacent.

7. Since Western governments have failed to craft and articulate a cohesive public narrative, explaining that Europe is facing the most serious threat to its security, stability and democratic values since World War II, public support for Ukraine is in decline on both sides of the Atlantic. In several European countries, the governments ‘We don’t want to become involved in the war’-mantra has not only fuelled public anxieties about further military escalation and increasingly blurred the lines between the victim and the aggressor; worse, it does not provide any concrete strategy how governments seek to move forward.

Moreover, still too many Western government officials, parliamentarians and security pundits portray Russia’s assault predominantly as a bilateral ‘Ukrainian-Russian conflict’ that has little to no meaning for the lives of ordinary Europeans and Americans. The Russian regime’s multiple threats to European security, our democratic societies and the rules-based international order are insufficiently explained and highlighted. Additionally, the bulk of Western journalists still fail to understand that they are participants of a full-fledged information war with Russia. Their media coverage sidelines the bigger strategic picture, often offers competent-free battlefield assessments and contributes to the unchecked circulation of fake news and disinformation.

8. Contrast to their Western backers, the Ukrainian leadership pro-actively seeks to influence the outcome of the war, both from a military, political, economic, and wider strategic perspective. President Zelensky’s tireless diplomatic efforts to advocate his ‘Peace Formula’ and ‘Roadmap to Victory’ are aimed at garnering and solidifying sufficient international support for Ukraine’s fight against the aggressor and boost public morale at home. What is missing, however, are regular, confidential but open-minded consultations between Kyiv and Western capitals how the war could possibly develop in the future. Evidently, there are numerous ‘wild cards’ and ‘unknowns’ that make scenario-planning challenging, but discussing plausible futures jointly would foster much-needed political confidence and transparency between Ukraine and its supporters. Evidently, Ukrainians hold the principal ownership of their national fate but developing a sense of joint ownership between Kyiv and Western capitals is vital if the Russian aggressor is to be defeated successfully.

Containing and straining Russia

9. Containing and constraining today’s Russia is the only viable strategic way-forward for the West, and in particular European countries which, collectively and individually, will likely face significant changes in their security relationship with the next U.S. Administration. NATO and EU leaders should officially embrace containment both as their overarching strategic objective as well as the process leading towards this goal. A dedicated containment strategy will have to be negotiated between the Western states and ideally, co-authored and co-signed by NATO and the EU, or by those member countries in agreement to a policy of containment. Its concrete operationalization and implementation will clearly require political focus by all parties involved.

While the individual elements of a robust, holistic and effects-based containment strategy needed to be detailed and operationalised, they, in essence, could involve the following key points:

Overall objective: The starting point of any future containment strategy must be the unambiguous acknowledgement that Russia poses an existential threat to Europe’s overall security. The West’s prime objective must therefore be to substantially reduce and ultimately eliminate the Russian military threat to the extent possible. Achieving this objective requires a long breath, an exceptional degree of political resolve, adequate financial, economic and military resources and a convincing narrative that help taking democratic societies along.

Unless the current Russian regime or the succeeding leadership in Moscow has fully abandoned its expansionist goals, refrained from the use of military force and coercion, withdrawn its forces from Ukrainian territory and adhered to international norms and regulations, negotiations about the country’s return to the Euro-Atlantic family do not make any sense. Western leaders should abandon any wishful thinking that Putin’s Russia can be managed through appeals, soft deals and appeasement. Ten years ago, President Putin began to trample on the principles of the NATO-Russia Strategic Partnership; there is no way back to the status quo ante.

Ukraine: As long as Russia seeks to destroy and subjugate Ukraine with brute military force, the West’s prime objective must be to help defeat Russian military forces in Ukraine and support the re-establishment of a secure, viable and independent Ukrainian state within its 1991 borders. Ensuring Ukraine’s survival and re-building as a European state must be a key element of Western containment. The most important means to achieve this objective are twofold:

a.) The provision of well-coordinated, long-term, and robust military, economic, humanitarian and financial support for Ukraine, ideally under the auspices of a joint coordinating NATO-EU body. There must be no Western national restrictions on the Ukraine’s use of military capabilities in targeting Russia’s LoCs, key military infrastructure and other internationally legal targets. Boosting Ukraine’s defence sector and military-technological production capacities and organising military capacity-building and training effectively should be two other legs of an ambitious ‘Ukraine enabling process’.

b.) Ultimately, Ukraine’s future security can only be safeguarded and guaranteed if the country moved under NATO’s collective defence umbrella. It is now high time for the NATO allies to lead Ukraine out the strategic void in which they have been leaving the country for the past 16 years. Negotiating Ukraine’s membership to NATO should no longer be delayed. Once accession talks have started, they will send a strong strategic message to Russia and provide credibility to the allies’ ‘Open Door’ policy as well as their repeated promises that ‘Ukraine will become a NATO member.’ Accession talks with Ukraine will also underpin the message that NATO will no longer accept any Russian veto over its decision to invite a country to join its ranks.

Since Ukraine’s full entry into NATO will not happen overnight, the negotiation process would be an important venue to discuss to discuss all military and legal aspects of Ukraine’s future membership, including a scenario in which the Russian-annexed territories would have to be temporarily exempted from full NATO cover, how NATO can help secure a potential truce between Ukraine and Russia or/and options to expand NATO’s air defence capabilities to cover Ukrainian cities. While these are complex and challenging issues, in the long run the Alliance will benefit from a combat-proven and resilient Ukraine.

Changing the narrative: Without a strong and compelling public narrative any Western containment effort will not be successful.

Placing public emphasis on how NATO seeks to upgrade and modernize its defence and deterrence posture to guard against the Russian threat is good and necessary; but since the strategic challenge goes far beyond the Alliance’s territory a compelling narrative must offer much more. In their public engagements Western leaders should systematically emphasize that Europe and the wider transatlantic community are ready to muster the courage to contain an aggressive and expansionist Russia as long as the threat persists; that realistically, we will be in a strategic confrontation with Russia for many years; that Russia’s war against Ukraine is also a war against European democratic countries since the Kremlin will continue to use nuclear blackmail, political coercion, targeted disinformation, migration as well as multiple hybrid and cyber warfare to destabilize our societies and governments; that we must strengthen our own resilience and preparedness to pro-actively defend in what we believe; that Europe whole, free and at peace is not an empty phrase but a strategic vision Europeans will jointly pursue, and that the world will be safer with Russia being defeated on the Ukrainian battlefield.

A compelling narrative should also aim at de-mystifying the Putin regime and describe it as it is: a vicious, kleptocratic and chauvinist regime that uses fear, force and intimidation to stay in power; that Russia lacks any positive vision for the future and meaningful economic clout, and that President Putin does not possess any ‚supernatural powers‘. The Western community must not be afraid to defend itself against his regime.

Whatever the political and most likely turbulent outcome of the war for the Russia regime, a convincing narrative should also highlight that Europeans do not fear a potential regime change in Moscow; to the contrary: a peaceful, non-aggressive Russia that respects democratic freedoms and the rule of law can only emerge once Putinism has collapsed.

Explaining to the European publics why there is no viable alternative to a steadfast containment strategy towards Russia, what the core objectives of such a strategy are and which concrete actions are required to be successful is a vital element of the containment strategy proper. Without a convincing and facts-based narrative citizens’ concerns about a possible spill-over of Russia’s war to other European countries and nuclear Armageddon scenarios will continue to dominate the public debates in Western countries.

Since a multi-domain containment strategy requires substantial financial resources, Western governments will have to make hard choices: offering convincing arguments why governments must generate additional financial resources in support of higher national defence expenditures, Ukrainian requirements, and economic measures will not be successful without having an overarching and convincing narrative in place.

Strategic ambiguity: Remaining explicitly ambiguous about our next steps and decisions, particularly those involving NATO’s military preparedness and Western military aid for Ukraine, should become a key means of the West’s strategic communications policy towards Russia. Instead of exposing our own political, economic limitations and defence shortcomings, and broadcasting their political disagreements and doubts 24/7 to Moscow and its supporters, Western governments should keep the Russian leadership in the dark about our next steps.

Strategic foresight: Neither Russia’s conflict with the West nor its military assault on Ukraine (nor any associated military conflict in Europe and its periphery) will evolve in a linear manner. Therefore, NATO and EU members must systematically invest time and energy in scenario-and contingency planning exercises. Strategic foresight activities could take place on two different levels: in NATO and EU-only formats that provide space to discuss uncomfortable ‘What If?’- questions (for example ‘What if Donald Trump makes a deal with Putin?’), and in joint formats with Ukrainian representatives to discuss broader future scenarios. Plausible future scenarios related to Ukraine could range the country’s forced surrender; Ukraine’s victory; a truce between Russia and Ukraine leading a ‘frozen conflict’ and a longer war of attrition. Further, future scenarios about Russia’s domestic potential developments could prove useful, too. Whether Ukraine and its Western backers assess these scenarios likely, how they intend to influence and prepare for each scenario, how they evaluate the strategic and national ramifications of them and if they can think of other, alternative scenarios than these four can be subject of discreetly held but frank discussions. National and joint intelligence production cannot substitute thought-processes in capitals, geared towards challenging and politically sensitive ‘What if’-questions.

Containing Russia from a position of military strength: The West cannot possibly contain a ruthless expansionist Russian Federation without having a credible conventional and nuclear military posture in place. For the foreseeable future, NATO is the only military alliance that hosts both credible and combat ready deterrent and defence forces. While much has be accomplished in the past two years to increase, upgrade and train NATO’s conventional and nuclear defence forces, the NATO allies must do more.

Agreeing on a more ambitious baseline than 2 % for national defence spending, accelerating the process of joint European procurement and capability development, adapting NATO’s deterrence by-denial concept, and re-thinking the allies’ future nuclear deterrence posture are some of the most critical items on the Alliance’s urgent to-do-list. But apart from upgrading NATO’s deterrence and defence forces, the allies should also tackle important political issues; notably how to boost and synchronize the European defence industry and which additional steps they can take to help member countries to establish a stronger whole-of-society-resilience.

Economic sanctions: A thread of national and international economic, financial and technological sanctions has been an instrumental part of the West’s response to the Russian assault on Ukraine. While Russia is now the most sanctioned country in the world, serious questions remain over the effectiveness of those sanctions as Russia has sought alternative markets, trade routes and methods for circumventing Western sanctions, including the use of a ‘shadow fleet’ of tankers, ageing vessels with obscure ownership to transport sanctioned Russian crude oil and exports to Russia’s neighbours and partners in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Particularly, Western exports via the later avenue have skyrocketed in the past two years. If Western governments continue to allow loopholes in their sanction regime, they will weaken an important component of a containment strategy. Identifying ways to water-proof sanctions and deny Moscow opportunities to circumvent them should be a top priority for Western governments.

Isolating Russia internationally: Isolating the Russian regime internationally is a ‘mission impossible’. But initiating a strategic-level dialogue between NATO and EU members how they can systematically constrain the Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis could generate a joint and better understanding about the strategic challenge at hand and identify means to weaken this axis. A concerted diplomatic approach by the West could also be helpful to reduce Moscow’s diplomatic leverage in international organizations and platforms, notably the UN, with the long-term goal to expel Russia from the UN Security Council.

Hold the Russian leadership accountable: According to Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General, members of Russian forces have committed more than 125,000 suspected war crimes since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities, international organisations and NGOs work hard to document the many cases of Russian authorities deporting Ukrainian children for illegal adoptions in Russia as well as instances of Russian troops torturing captives and civilians and carrying out indiscriminate sexual violence on children, women and men ranging in age from 4 to 82 years old. Establishing grounds to hold Russia accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity is an ongoing collective and painful work strand. While preparations at the International Criminal Court and the Council of Europe are already to hold the Russian leadership accountable for their illegal actions, Western governments talk very little about this important aspect in public. Western states should underscore that their legal efforts to hold the President Putin, other senior Kremlin figures and Russian military commanders accountable are an incremental part of their policy to uphold and defend the rule of law.